Bonjour Externalist Theories Of Empirical Knowledge Pdf Download !!HOT!!
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Knowledge externalism, at least with respect to accessibility, isgenerally regarded as just the denial of knowledge internalism. If wehad rested content with knowledge internalism as we first stated it,which required some form of accessibility to all of one'sknowledge basis, then knowledge externalism would just be the denialof that internalist position. But that would not be an interestingknowledge externalist position. For, denying that one can access byreflection all of one's knowledge basis for a proposition pis perfectly compatible with one being able to access some of one'sknowledge basis for p, indeed some essential part of thatbasis. Knowledge externalism, however, wants to incorporate the ideathat in some cases one cannot access any of one's knowledgebasis. Knowledge externalism, then, aims to deny the partial knowledgebasis accounts. As we have two of the latter we will naturally expectto find two versions of externalism with respect to accessibility. Aweak version of accessibility externalism for knowledge will denymerely the strong version of AKI, thus:
Weak externalism of this variety is perfectly compatible with one formof accessibility internalism concerning knowledge, namely weak AKI.Defenders of externalism, however, most likely would be interested ingoing beyond this weak form to an externalist position that is morewide-ranging. This stronger version of externalism would be this:
This theory is illustrative only. No defender of a reliable processtheory of justification is apt to regard reliability as determinedmerely by the actual frequency of true versus false belief productionor sustenance. Instead, reliability would be thought of as apropensity that a method M has to produce or sustainmostly true beliefs. This important point about how to best understandreliability, however, will not affect the point just made concerningreliable process theories and externalism regarding justification.Exactly the same argument will apply when reliability is understood asa propensity. Reliability of that sort as applied to processM will suffice for the belief to be justified.. Accessibilityvia reflection to any of the justifiers, if present as a capability inS, will not be relevant to her being justified in believingp, and neither will the absence of such a capability. So, ifthe reliable process theory as here depicted is correct as an accountof justified belief, then internalism regarding justification would befalse. This point about lack of access to justifiers is the maincontention of the externalist thesis regarding justification. (Theactual long run frequency and propensity interpretations ofreliability were clearly noted in Goldman 1979, 11. Reference tojustifiers is not there made by Goldman; that term came into use abouta decade later in work by Alston. Goldman gives more refined andcomplex statements of the theory, making use of J-rules, in Goldman1986, 2009.)
In 1980, Bonjour criticized the reliabilism of Armstrong and Goldman, proposing internalist approach to epistemic truth and knowledge justification.[4] He formulated the examples of a clairvoyant and her reliable forecasts about the presence of the U.S. president in New York City.[4] Some years later, in his essay Externalist theories of empirical knowledge Bonjour extended his internalist criticism against the foundationalist theory, saying it was unable to provide enough reasons for justification and to solve the regress problem.[citation needed]
Among epistemologists, it is not uncommon to relate various forms of epistemic luck to the vexed debate between internalists and externalists. But there are many internalism/externalism debates in epistemology, and it is not always clear how these debates relate to each other. In the present paper I investigate the relation between epistemic luck and prominent internalist and externalist accounts of epistemic justification. I argue that the dichotomy between internalist and externalist concepts of justification can be characterized in terms of epistemic luck. Whereas externalist theories of justification are incompatible with veritic luck but not with reflective luck, the converse is true for internalist theories of justification. These results are found to explain and cohere with some recent findings from elsewhere in epistemology, and support a surprising picture of justification, on which internalism and externalism are complementary rather than contradictory positions.
In this paper, I argue for two claims: (i) internalist and externalist theories of justification can be distinguished in terms of epistemic luck, (ii) these accounts should be seen as complementary rather than contradictory theories of justification. To this end, I provide in Sect. 1 definitions of the two forms of epistemic luck relevant for this paper: veritic luck and reflective luck. In Sect. 2, I consider two prominent externalist theories of justification (reliabilism and competence based justification) and argue that they are incompatible with veritic luck but not with reflective luck. In Sect. 3, I consider two prominent internalist theories of justification (accessibilism and mentalism), and argue that they are incompatible with reflective luck but not with veritic luck.Footnote 3 In Sect. 4, I integrate these results with recent claims made by William Alston about epistemic justification and Ernest Sosa about the structure of knowledge, and argue that internalism and externalism are complimentary rather than contradictory theories of justification.
In this section I argue that some of the most prominent externalist theories of justification are compatible with reflective luck but not with veritic luck. This claim is to be understood as follows: these theories of justification entail that justified belief is not veritically lucky, but they allow for the possibility of justified belief that is reflectively lucky. We will consider the incompatibility with veritic luck first, and then the compatibility with reflective luck.
We have seen two prominent externalist theories of justification that are incompatible with veritic luck, but not with reflective luck. We will now argue that the contrary holds for prominent internalist theories of justification: these conceptions of justification entail the absence of reflective luck, but not of veritic luck. The first form of internalism that we will take a look at is called accessibilism. Its central thesis is:
In this section I consider some implications of the findings from the previous sections. We found that prominent externalist theories of justification are incompatible with veritic luck but compatible with reflective luck. The converse was true for the considered internalist theories of justification: they were found to be incompatible with reflective luck but not with veritic luck.
Our findings indicate that it is a feature of externalist theories of justification in general that they exclude veritic luck but not reflective luck, and of internalist theories of justification in general that they exclude reflective luck but not veritic luck. Our findings thus suggest a new way of distinguishing internalist and externalist theories of epistemic justification. This an advantage because the usual ways of demarcation remain rather vague: 2b1af7f3a8